About half of Russians look at their own future and the future of Russia with calmness and confidence, but positive assessments have been decreasing slightly in the last two years. Almost half of the respondents have no plans for the future. About the same number say they don’t know what will happen to them even in the coming months. Approximately one in five respondents plans their lives for 5-6 years or more ahead. They have more positive assessments of the future, and they also plan their lives for a longer period of time, most often young people who are more affluent and loyal to government policies.
Press-releases
Institutional Trust: September 2025
After a sharp increase in 2022, the level of institutional confidence has remained high in recent years, and in the September measurement, most indicators have again updated their maximum values. As before, Russians most often talk about trusting the president, the army, the security services, the government, and the church. The respondents are least likely to talk about trust in political parties, trade unions, and large Russian businesses.
The summit of the Presidents of Russia and the United States in Alaska and the improvement of Russian-American relations
The majority of Russians have a positive attitude towards the talks between the presidents of Russia and the United States in Alaska. One in two believes that this meeting will help end the conflict in Ukraine and have a positive impact on relations between the two countries. Attitudes towards the United States continue to improve rapidly; today, less than a third of respondents have a negative attitude towards United States. About half of Russians rate the current relations between Russia and the United States as negative, but the share of positive assessments is growing. Today, the attitude towards the United States in Russia has returned to its before-2014 levels.
Conflict with Ukraine: attention, support, attitude to negotiations, use of nuclear weapons, possibility of conflict between Russia and NATO
In June 2025, half of the respondents followed the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Three quarters supported the actions of the Russian armed forces. At the same time, two thirds of Russians would like to start peace negotiations. Compared to last year, the proportion of people who consider the use of nuclear weapons in the current conflict to be justified has significantly decreased. More than half of the respondents today still fear that the situation could escalate into an armed clash between Russia and NATO
Ratings of June 2025: sentiments, opinions on the state of affairs in the country, approval of authorities, trust in politicians and parties, presidential electoral ratings
Most Russians are in a normal, even state, the proportion of those who say they are in a good mood is slightly decreasing, and the proportion of those who experience negative emotions is slightly increasing. The majority of respondents believe that the country is moving in the right direction. Positive assessments prevail with regard to government authorities, however, compared to last month, there is a slight decrease in the approval levels of the State Duma and the government. According to the open-ended question, Russians trust Vladimir Putin, Mikhail Mishustin, and Sergey Lavrov the most.
The conflict with Ukraine: attention, support, attitude to the negotiations in Istanbul and various conflict resolution options
In May 2025, attention to the Ukrainian events increased – more than half of the respondents are closely monitoring the situation. The share of respondents who support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine has increased slightly. The share of Russians in favor of peace talks reached two-thirds of the sample. The respondents named the Istanbul talks as one of the main events of the past month. The vast majority of Russians support these negotiations because they mean the return of prisoners of war and bring the conflict closer to resolution. Respondents who do not support the Istanbul talks explain this by saying that these negotiations will lead to nothing. The majority of respondents support the Russian formula of negotiations, in which the root causes are eliminated first and only then a cease-fire occurs. Respondents blame the Ukrainian side and European countries for their unwillingness to resolve the conflict.
Level of xenophobia and interethnic tension, attitudes towards newcomers, possibility of clashes on ethnic grounds: April 2025
The attitude of Russians towards migrants remains negative: the majority of respondents believe that they increase crime rates and negatively affect the economy and culture. Seven out of ten respondents believe that the influx of newcomers should be limited and all illegal migrants should be expelled from the country. At the same time, the majority of respondents do not feel interethnic tension in their place of residence, do not feel open hostility from people of other nationalities and do not experience it themselves. However, up to a third of respondents consider mass clashes possible at the national level within the country.
Sentiments about emigration and attitudes towards those who left: April 2025
Nine out of ten Russians would not like to move abroad permanently, which is the highest figure in 35 years of observation. Young people and opposition-minded citizens are more likely to move than others. The main reasons for moving, according to respondents, are an interest in another culture, a desire to provide their children with a decent future abroad, and the economic and political situation in Russia. Respondents most often name the United States, Spain, Italy and other European countries, as well as South Korea and Australia, as the destination for their relocation. Almost every fifth respondent has relatives or friends who have left Russia in the last two or three years. The attitude towards those who left Russia is ambiguous: some consider them traitors, while others say that they want to achieve more abroad.
Sources of information: frequency of use and trust, news fatigue, popular journalists and bloggers
Television is still the main source of information for Russians, but the total audience of Internet sources exceeds the television audience. For the first time, the share of the daily audience of online sources exceeded the share of those who watch news on television every day. Younger, educated, and well-off respondents are more likely to learn about news from the Internet. Older, less educated, and less well-off people watch news on television more often. About one in ten people learns the news on the radio, and the portrait of a radio listener is similar to that of a television viewer. During the Soviet era, two thirds of the respondents listened to radio more or less regularly, primarily Radio Mayak, and about 8% listened to foreign radio stations. The respondents believe that they are better versed in Russian events than in foreign ones. At the same time, most people do not feel tired from the daily news. V. Solovyov was named the most popular journalist/blogger, the respondents also mentioned O. Skabeeva, E. Popov, D. Kiselev and E. Poddubny. Poddubny.
The conflict with Ukraine in April 2025: attention, support, attitude towards negotiations, attitude towards the participants in the Special Military Operation
Attention to the Ukrainian events has been decreasing in recent months. The level of support for the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine remains high. Over a half of the respondents believe that peace negotiations should be initiated, and about a third believe that military operations should be continued. There is no clear opinion in society about whether the “special military operation” has brought more benefit or harm. Respondents see benefits in the return of territories, the liberation of people, import substitution, and strengthening Russia’s authority in the world. The harm lies in the death of people. Most of the respondents believe that the veterans of the Special Military Operation are treated with respect in society. The respondents believe that after the completion of the “special military operation”, its participants will first of all be able to find themselves in military affairs, law enforcement agencies or in the field of youth education.